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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
VERNON E. BUSH
Plaintiff and Respondent

vs.
COMMERCE PROPERTIES, INC. a
corporation, and RICHARD C.
BENNION,

Supreme Court
No. 880100

Defendants and Appellants
Court of Appeals
and
No. 880254-CA
PROCESS INSTRUMENTS & CONTROL,
INC., and JOHN A. HALL

District Court

Defendants and Respondents

No. C87-1224

APPELLANTS' BRIEF
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Jurisdiction was conferred on the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to a
transfer of the case by the Utah Supreme Court on April 11,1988, pursuant
to Rule 4A of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court.
The lower court entered judgment against all defendants for the
architectural services rendered by Vernon E. Bush. It found that the
Commerce Properties, Inc. and Richard C. Bennion had a 10% interest in a
joint venture with Process Instruments & Control, Inc and John Hall, but
were responsible for I/2 of the judgment for the bill owed Vernon C. Bush.
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From this judgment establishing Commerce Properties, Inc. and Richard C.
Bennion liable for 1/2 of the judgment, this appeal was taken.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1. Was there any evidence to establish Richard C. Bennion as being
personally liable for the architectural services rendered by Vernon E.
Bush?
2. Did the judgment entered against Commerce Properties, Inc.
violate the provisions of Sec. 70A-2-201, and 25-5-4(2), U.C.A., 1953, as
amended?
3. Did the judgment entered against Commerce Properties, Inc. for
50% of the Vernon E. Bush bill conform to the findings showing that
Commerce Properties, Inc. only had a 10% interest in the venture?
DISPOSITIVE STATUTES AND RULES
"70A-2-201.
Formal requirements-Statute of Frauds
(1)
Except as otherwise provided in this section a contract for the
sale of goods for the price of $500 or more is not enforceable
by way of action or defense unless there is some writing
sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale has been made
between the parties and signed by the party against whom
enforcement is sought or by his authorized agent or broker. A
writing is not insufficient because it omits or incorrectly
states a term agreed upon but the contract is not enforceable
under this paragraph beyond the quantity of goods shown in
such writing.

(3)

A contract
subsection
enforceable
(a)
if the
buyer

which does not satisfy the requirements
(1) but which is valid in other respects

of
is

goods are to be specially manufactured for the
and are not suitable for sale to others in the
-2-

(b)

(c)

ordinary course of the seller's business and the seller,
before notice of repudiation is received and under
circumstances which reasonably indicate that the goods
are for the buyer, has made either a substantial
beginning of their manufacture or commitments for their
procurement; or
if the party against whom enforcement is sought admits
in his pleading, testimony or otherwise in court that a
contract for sale was made, but the contract is not
enforceable under this provision beyond the quantity of
goods admitted; or
with respect to goods for which payment has been made
and accepted or which have been received and accepted
(section 70a-2-206)

"25-5-4.
Certain agreements void unless written and
subscribed. In the following cases every agreement shall be void
unless such agreement, or some note or memorandum thereof, is in
writing subscribed by the party to be charged therewith:
(1) Every agreement that by its terms is not to be performed
within one year from the making thereof.
(2)
Every promise to answer for the debt, default or
miscarriage of another.

"Rule 52. Findings by the Court.
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury
or with an advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and
state separately its conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall
be entered pursuant to Rule 58A; in granting or refusing interlocutory
injunctions the court shall similarly set forth the findings of fact and
conclusions of law which constitute the grounds of its action.
Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of review.
Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence,
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall
-3-

be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility
of the witnesses. The findings of a master, to the extent that the
court adopts them, shall be considered as the findings of the court. It
will be sufficient if the findings of fact and conclusions of law are
stated orally and recorded in open court following the close of the
evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of decision filed by
the court.
The trial court need not enter findings of fact and
conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule
41(b). The court shall, however, issue a brief written statement of
the ground for its decision on all motions granted under Rules 12(b),
50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 when the motion is based on more than one
ground.
"48-1-15. Rules determining rights and duties of
partners. The rights and duties of the partners in relation to
the partnership shall be determined, subject to any agreement
between them, by the following rules:
(1) Each partner.... must contribute towards the losses,
whether of capital or otherwise, sustained by the partnership
according to his share in the profits."

STATEMENT QF THE CASE
This was an action to collect fees for architectural services rendered
by Vernon E. Bush for a custom designed building for Process Instruments
& Control, Inc. (the PIC Building). Vernon E. Bush also brought this action
against Commerce Properties, Inc. which acted as the real estate broker
and project manager for Process Instruments & Control, Inc.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The following are the facts deemed most favorable to respondents on
appeal. Respondent Bush performed customized architectural services and
provided $13,000.00 in plans and designs for a building to be constructed

for and purchased by Respondent Process Instruments & Control and John
Hall.(Findings 3 and 6, R. 49, 50) Appellant Commerce Properties acted
as the project manager for Process Instruments & Control (PIC) and John
Hall to assist them in arranging for the purchase of the land, financing,
and construction of the PIC building. For its services, Commerce
Properties was to receive a 10% commission if the project proceeded.
(Finding 3, R. 49) Based on this commission arrangement, the lower court
found that Commerce Properties, Inc. and Richard C. Bennion were
co-venturers with PIC and John Hall. (Finding 3, R. 49)
PIC and John Hall paid for all costs incurred except Vernon E. Bush's,
including the appraisals, additional construction drawings made by Felt
Construction based on Bush's architectural drawings, the bank origination
loan fees, financing services, etc.(TR.126-127). PIC and John Hall
subsequently abandoned the project after the loan was approved, and
elected to lease other space, according to the testimony of John Hall:
"Q. Now, in December you received a commitment from
Zions Bank for half of the funding; is that correct?
A. That is correct. After reading the document today,
yes.
Q. All right. So Mr. Bennion wasn't holding up the project
to build the building for you at that time; it was pending your
financing application; isn't that correct?
A. That's exactly what the Earnest Money stated.
Q. All right. And Mr. Bennion was not in a position to
abandon the SBA application, was he?
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A. I don't believe so.
Q. So basically it was your decision to abandon the SBA
application; isn't that correct?
A. Yes it was." (TR.125)

Q. And you abandoned the SBA financing approximately
when?
A. I believe the early part of '86. (TR 128-129)
Q. So you got in a new space without having to advance
significant fees?
A. That is correct. (TR. 129)
After abandoning the project, PIC and John Hall did not pay Commerce
Properties, Inc. (TR. 137) or Vernon E. Bush for their services.(TR.127).
From the judgment entered by the trial court determining that Commerce
Properties, Inc. and Richard C. Bennion was only a 10% joint venture
partner, but responsible for one half of Mr. Bush's architectural services
bill (Judgment, R. 45), this appeal was taken.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
a. There was no evidence presented at trial establishing Richard C.
Bennion at any time acted in an individual capacity, and therefore the
personal judgment entered against him was in error.
b. The judgment entered against Commerce Properties, Inc. violated
the provisions of Sec. 70A-2-201, and 25-5-4(2), U.C.A., 1953, as
amended. There was no writing entered in evidence where Commerce
-6-

Properties, Inc. signed an agreement with Vernon E. Bush to answer for
the obligations of PIC and John Hall for whom the engineered plans and
drawings worth in excess of $500.00 were made. Without a writing, the
provider, Vernon E. Bush, may only recover against PIC and John Hall who
received the benefits conferred from his customized engineering building
plans.
c. The conclusions of law that Commerce Properties, Inc. and Richard
C. Bennion are responsible for 1/2 of Vernon E. Bush's bill conflict with
the findings of fact establishing Commerce Properties, Inc. as only a 10%
joint venture partner with PIC and John Hall.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
RICHARD C. BENNION WAS NOT ACTING IN AN INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY
Under Rule 52 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, in all actions tried
upon the facts without a jury, the court shall find the facts specially and
state separately its conclusions of law thereon. These findings of fact
must be based on oral or documentary evidence. Rule 52 states:
Rule 52. Findings by the court.
"(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without
a jury
the court shall find the facts specially and state
separately its conclusions of law thereon
Findings of fact,
whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set
aside unless clearly erroneous
There was no evidence presented at trial establishing Richard C.
Bennion at any time acted in an individual capacity, and therefore the
-7-

personal judgment entered against him was in error. Commerce
Properties, Inc. is a 35 member real estate brokerage firm incorporated
and licensed to do business in the State of Utah. All the documentary
evidence indicated that Commerce Properties, Inc. was retained as project
manager, and was to receive a 10% contingent commission if the PIC
Building was constructed. Nor was there any oral evidence given which
established that Richard C. Bennion was the alter ego of Commerce
Properties, Inc., or that he was acting in an individual capacity. The
findings and judgment against Richard C. Bennion, individually, were
therefore entered without any support on the record, and should be set
aside as being clearly erroneous; see Harker vs. Condominiums Forest Glen,
Inc., 740 P.2d 1361 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
POINT TWO
THERE WAS NO WRITING SIGNED BY COMMERCE PROPERTIES. INC.
ASSUMING RESPONSIBILITY FOR VERNON E. BUSH'S DRAWINGS
Under Sec. 70A-2-201, U.C. A., 1953, as amended, except as otherwise
provided in this section, a contract for the sale of goods for the price of
$500.00 or more (the $13,000.00 Bush drawings, engineering studies, and
specifications for the PIC Building) is not enforceable by way of action or
defense unless there is some writing sufficient to indicate that a contract
for sale has been made between the parties and signed by the party against
whom enforcement is sought or by his authorized agent or broker.
70A-2-201, U.C.A., I953, as amended, states:
70A-2-201. Formal Requirements-Statute of Frauds
(1)
"Except as otherwise provided in this section a contract
for the sale of goods for the price of $500 or more is not
-8-

Sec.

enforceable by way of action or defense unless there is
some writing sufficient to indicate that a contract for
sale has been made between the parties and signed by the
party against whom enforcement is sought or by his
authorized agent or broker....

(3)

A contract which does not satisfy the requirements of
subsection (1) but which is valid in other respects is
enforceable
(a) if the goods are to be specially manufactured for the
buyer and are not suitable for sale to others in the
ordinary course of the seller's business and the seller,
before notice of repudiation is received and under
circumstances which reasonably indicated that the goods
are for the buyer, has made either a substantial
beginning of their manufacture of commitments for their
procurement; or
(b) if the party against whom enforcement is sought
admits in his pleading, testimony or otherwise in court
that a contract for sale was made, but the contract is
not enforceable under the provision beyond the quantity
of goods admitted; or
(c) with respect to goods for which payment has been
made and accepted or which have been received and
accepted (section 70a-2-606)."

The record is devoid of any writings signed by Commerce Properties,
Inc. where it agreed to pay Vernon E. Bush for the drawings. Therefore,
liability for payment of the same, must lie under the exceptions outlined
in Sec. 70A-2-201 (3). These exceptions outlined in Sec. 70A-2-201 (3)(1)
are: (a) production of custom designed goods for the benefit of the party
to be bound , (b) admissions in the pleadings or on the record that a
contract for sale was made, and (c) receipt and acceptance of the goods by
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the party to be bound. There were no admissions in the pleadings or on the
record that Commerce Properties agreed to pay for the Bush drawings;
therefore any liability to be imposed against Commerce Properties,
Inc.would have to be imposed under subsections 70A-2-201(a) or (c).
It was uncontroverted that the Bush drawings were custom designed
for the construction of the PIC building to meet the Process Instruments &
Control, Inc.'s operating requirements. Mr. Hall personally provided rough
drawings to Mr. Bush of the floor plan meeting his needs (Exhibit P-2). Mr.
Bush testified he met several times with Mr. Hall who provided
handwritten changes to the drawings (Exhibit P-3F):
"A. There were a number of occasions when in the
process of developing the preliminaries, I dropped off plans at
Mr. Hall's office andQ. When you dropped off the plans to his office, did you
see him personally?
A. On one occasion, I did. Most of the time I gave them
to his receptionist.

Q. Before we get to that meeting, I wanted to draw your
attention to the exhibits in this packet that were marked up by
Mr. Hall. If you would, would you go through and indicate which
of those exhibits bear Mr. Hall's handwriting?
A. P-3F."
(TR.31,32)
Mr. Bush and his structural engineer Fred Fife testified that this
-10-

custom floor plan design required a unique pillar spacing for the PIC
building, which resulted in higher engineering costs than would normally
be anticipated for a standard building design. Mr. Fife explained the reason
for these higher costs as follows:
"Q. What is the difference between the PIC building and
some of the other buildings that you have been designing in the
6,000 square foot range that justified the additional work?
A. Well, the PIC building was rather unique. In fact
every building is unique, but this one had particularly unusual
column spacings and generally unique foyers that caused a need
for extra attention to the design process.
Q. What would a conventional building be in the range of
in the 6,000 square foot range for doing your typical review?
A. A review? Or do you mean design?
Q. Same type of work you did for PIC.
A. Well, might be I would guess maybe half as much time
to design a 6,000 square foot warehouse building.
Q. So this was not--this was more of a customized type
of project than you were normally used to seeing?
A.

Yes, it was."

(TR 147-148).
The drawings were custom designed for Process Instruments &
Control, Inc. and its owner, John Hall's, needs-not Commerce Properties,
Inc.'s. Therefore, liability against Commerce Properties, Inc. under
-11-

subsection (a) will not lie.
Under subsection (c), receipt and acceptance of the custom designed
goods was directly made by Process Instruments & Control, Inc. The Bush
PIC drawings were forwarded to Process Instruments & Control, Inc. and
used to apply for the loan to construct the PIC building (Exhibit D-13).
Therefore, liability against Commerce Properties, Inc. under subsection (c)
will not lie.
Nor was there any writing where Commerce Properties, Inc. agreed to
answer to the Bush debt incurred by Process Instruments & Control, Inc. as
required under Sec. 25-5-4(2),U.C.A., 1953, as amended. Sec. 25-5-4(2),
U.C.A., 1953, as amended provides:
25-5-4. Certain agreements void unless written
and subscribed. "In the following cases every agreement
shall be void unless such agreement, or some note or
memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by the part to by
charged therewith:
(2) Every promise to answer for the debt, default or
miscarriage of another.
Recovery against Commerce Properties, Inc. can therefore only be had
under a quantum meruit or theory of unjust enrichment; see Baugh vs. Darly
(1947) 112 U. 1,184 P.2d 335. As Process Instruments & Control, Inc.
directly received the benefit of the Bush custom designed PIC Building
drawings, and used the same for their building loan application, Process
Instruments & Control, Inc. should pay for the value of the drawings
received; especially where it arbitrarily elected to drop the loan
application after the same was approved. Commerce Properties, Inc. could
-12-

not use these special purpose drawings for any other development. Nor did
it receive any benefit from these plans.
In summary, the judgment entered against Commerce Properties, Inc.
violated the provisions of Sec. 70A-2-201, and 25-5-4(2), U.C.A., 1953, as
amended. There was no writing entered in evidence where Commerce
Properties, Inc. signed an agreement with Vernon E. Bush to answer for the
obligations of PIC and John Hall for whom the plans worth in excess of
$500.00 were drawn. Without a writing, the provider Vernon E. Bush may
only recover against Process Instruments & Control and John Hall who
received the benefits conferred by the customized engineering PIC
building plans; see Fabian vs. Wasatch Orchard Co. (1912), 41 U. 404,125
P. 860 LRA 1916D, 892, distinguished in 56 U. 243,188 P. 640.
POINT THREE
THE CONCLUSIONS OF LAW THAT COMMERCE PROPERTIES WAS A
50/50 JOINT VENTURE PARTNER CONFLICT WITH THE FINDINGS AND
ARE THEREFORE WRONG AS A MATTER OF LAW
If Commerce Properties, Inc. is liable for payment of Vernon E. Bush's
services, it is only responsible for 10% of the bill, not 50%. Under
Paragraph 3 of the Findings of Fact, Commerce Properties, Inc. and
Richard C. Bennion had a 10% contingent interest in the joint venture.
Paragraph 3 of the Findings of Fact states:
"3. The evidence shows that all of the defendants were
engaged in a joint venture with the intent of purchasing the
real property described in the Earnest Money Agreement,
constructing a building thereon for the use and benefit of the
defendants. Process Instruments & Control. Inc. and John A.
Hall, from which transaction the defendants. Commerce
-13-

Properties. Inc. and Richard C. Bennion. were to receive ten
percent (10%^ of the total cost of said venture."
The lower court specifically found that the building was to be
constructed for Process Instruments & Control, Inc. and its owner John A.
Hall. It further found that Commerce Properties, Inc. and Richard C.
Bennion were only to receive ten percent (10%) of the total cost of said
venture. Therefore, under Sec. 48-1-15(1), Utah Code Annotated, I953, as
amended, if these defendants were only liable for Vernon E. Bush bill, they
were only liable for 10% of it. Sec. 48-1-15(1), Utah Code Annotated, I953,
as amended, states:
48-1-15. Rules determining rights and duties of
partners. The rights and duties of the partners in relation to
the partnership shall be determined, subject to any agreement
between them, by the following rules:
(1) Each partner.... must contribute towards the losses,
whether of capital or otherwise, sustained by the partnership
according to his share in the profits.
The conclusions of law are therefore in error that appellants were
responsible for I/2 of the bill for Vernon E. Bush's architectural services,
and should be set aside or modified to reflect their ten percent (10%)
interest in the joint venture found by the lower court; see Western Kane
County Special Serv. Dist. No. 1 vs. Jackson Cattle Co., 744 P.2d 1376 (Utah
1987). Alternatively, if appellants are responsible for one half of the bill
for architectural services, they are entitled to seek contribution and
reimbursement from defendants Process Instruments & Control, Inc. and
John A. Hall for 90% of any amounts appellants have to pay in accordance
-14-

with the percentages of the partnership.

CONCLUSION
The personal judgment against Richard C. Bennion should be set aside
as there was no evidence that he acted in an individual capacity to be
personally responsible for the Bush architectural services. Nor was there
any writing upon which Commerce Properties, Inc. can be held responsible
for the customized PIC drawings, and engineering prepared for John A.
Hall, and Process Instruments & Control, Inc. In the event liability for the
architectural drawings and engineering services is imposed against
appellants under the facts of this case, liability should be reduced and
apportioned to reflect appellants' contingent 10% interest in the venture.
Alternatively, appellants should be entitled to judgment against
defendants and respondents Hall and PIC for 90% reimbursement of any
amounts they are required to pay.
Dated this 21 st day of July, I988.

Marcus G. Theodore
Attorney for Appellants
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ADDENDUM

RULES AND STATUTES

STATUTE OF FRAUDS
rejected written offer. Mendelson v. Roland
(1926) 66 U 487,243 P 798.
Surrender, release or discharge.
Surrender of interest under contract for
purchase of land could be properly effected
without deed or conveyance in writing in

25-5-4

compliance with statute. Budge v. Barron
(1917) 51 U 234,169 P 745.
Collateral References.
Frauds, Statute of <£» 71 et seq.
37 CJS Frauds, Statute of § 90 et seq.
72 AmJur 2d 616 et seq., Statute of Frauds
§ 59 et seq.

25-5-4. Certain agreements void unless written and subscribed. In
the following cases every agreement shall be void unless such agreement,
or some note or memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party
to be charged therewith:
(1) Every agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within
one year from the making thereof.
$\ Every promise to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of
aifSther.
(3) Every agreement, promise or undertaking made upon consideration
of marriage, except mutual promises to marry.
(4) Every special promise made by an executor or administrator to
answer in damages for the liabilities, or to pay the debts, of the testator
or intestate out of his own estate.
(5) Every agreement authorizing or employing an agent or broker to
purchase or sell real estate for compensation.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 2467; L. Alteration or modification of original contract.
1909, ch. 72, § 1; C.L. 1917, § 5817; R.S. 1933
& C. 1943, 33-5-4.
If original contract, to be binding and
enforceable, and to satisfy the statute of
Compiler's Notes.
frauds, is required to be in writing and subAnalogous former statutes, Comp. Laws scribed by parties sought to be charged, then
a subsequent agreement altering or modify1876, §1014; 2 Comp. Laws 1888, §§2835, ing
any of its material parts or terms is also
3918, 4219.
required to be in writing and so subscribed,
no part performance or anything done by
Affirmative defense.
such party in reliance on the subsequent
When action is on contract, admitted by agreement being alleged or proved, especially
defendant, he must interpose special plea of if interest in land is involved. Combined Metstatute if statute is to be available as als, Inc. v. Bastian (1928) 71 U 535, 267 P
defense. Abba v. Smyth (1899) 21 U 109, 59 1020, distinguished in 100 U 516, 116 P 2d
578.
P756.
Parties may modify orally an agreement in
Statute of frauds must be pleaded by party
where the original contract is not
relying upon it as a defense. M & S Constr. writing
required by statute of frauds to be in writing,
& Engineering Co. v. Clearfield State Bank at least where there is consideration for such
(1967) 19 U 2d 86, 426 P 2d 227.
modification. But a contract required by statDefendant, who answered by a general ute of frauds to be in writing cannot be moddenial and simultaneous motion to dismiss ified by a subsequent oral agreement,
plaintiffs claim as being barred under although this rule is subject to many excepsubsec. (2) of this section, proceeded improp- tions, the first great division coming between
erly, since under Rule 12(b), Utah Rules of executory and executed modifications.
Civil Procedure, statute of frauds is not a Bamberger Co. v. Certified Productions, Inc.
(1935) 88 U 194, 48 P 2d 489, affirmed on
ground for motion to dismiss but rather an rehearing 88 U 213, 53 P 2d 1153.
affirmative defense under Rule 8(c). W. W. &
An oral modification of a contract required
W. B. Gardner, Inc. v. Pappas (1970) 24 U 2d to be in writing, when such modification is
264,470 P 2d 252.
fully executed, is taken out of the statute. In

31

GENERAL PARTNERSHIP
In absence of agreement or proof of agreement to contrary, partners will divide profits
and losses equally. Kimball v. McCornick
(1927) 70 U 189,259 P 313.

48-1-18

option or executory contract for the property,
152 ALR1001.
Liability of partner for failure to perform
personal services, 165 ALR 981.
Meaning and coverage of "book value" in
partnership agreement in determining value
of
partner's interest, 47 ALR 2d 1425.
Partner's breach of fiduciary duty to
"partner on sale of PartnersMp interest to
another partner, 4 ALR 4th 1122.
Powers, duties, and accounting responsibilities of man aging partner of mining partnerBhip, 24 ALR 2d 1359.
Provision of partnership agreement giving
one partner option to buy out the other, 160
ALR 523.
Relative rights of surviving partner and
the estate of the deceased partner in proceeds of life insurance acquired pursuant to
partnership agreement, 83 ALR 2d 1347.
Right of partner or member of joint adventure to share in misappropriated money or
property, or secret profits for which he is
required to account, 118 ALR 640.
Right of partners inter se in respect of
interest, 66 ALR 3.
Salaries of partners, contract as to, 66
ALR 2d 1023.

Collateral References.
Partnership <S=> 70.
68 CJS Partnership § 76
60 AmJur 2d 35 to 42, Partnership H108
tollc
....
.
t.
Accountabihty of partners for profits
earned subsequent to death or dissolution, 80
ALR 12, 55 ALR 2d 1391.
Actions at law between partners and partnerships, 58 ALR 621,168 ALR 1088.
Construction and application of section 18
(f) of Uniform Partnership Act as to surviving partner's right to compensation for services in winding up partnership, 81 ALR 2d
445.
Duty of former partner, acquiring property
occupied by partnership business, to renew
lease, 40 ALR 2d 102.
Duty of one who joins with others as partners or members of a joint adventure in the
purchase of property from a third person to
share with them the benefit of an existing

48-1-16. Partnership books. The partnership books shall be kept, subject to any agreement between the partners, at the principal place of business of the partnership, and every partner shall at all times have access
to and may inspect and copy any of them.
History L. 1921, ch. 89, § 19; R.S. 1933 &
C. 1943,69-1-16.

Collateral References.
Partnership <S=> 80.
68 CJS Partnership § 91.
60 AmJur 2d 167, Partnership § 264.

48-1-17. Duty of partners to render information. Partners shall
render on demand true and full information of all things affecting the
partnership to any partner, or the legal representatives of any deceased
partner, or partner under legal disability.
Hiatory: L. 1921, ch. 89, § 20; R.S. 1933 &
60 AmJur 2d 35, 47, Partnership §§ 108,
C. 1943,69-1-17.
123.
Collateral References.
Partner's breach of fiduciary duty to
Partnership C=> 70.
copartner on sale of partnership interest to
68 CJS Partnership § 76.
another partner, 4 ALR 4th 1122.

48-1-18. Partner accountable as a fiduciary. Every partner must
account to the partnership for any benefit, and hold as trustee for it any
profits, derived by him without the consent of the other partners from any
transaction connected with the formation, conduct or liquidation of the
partnership or from any use by him of its property.
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48-1-19

PARTNERSHIP

This section applies also to the representatives of a deceased partner
engaged in the liquidation of the affairs of the partnership as the personal
representatives of the last surviving partner.
History: L 1921, ch. 89, § 21; R.S. 1933 <& nishing labor should constitute partnership
income. Paggi v. Skliris (1919) 54 U 88,179 P
C. 1943. 69-1-18.
739.
Breach of trust.
Relations inter se.
Where employee of one of group of joint
The relation of partners as between themadventurers, seeking to buy and sell certain selves is a fiduciary one, that of trustee and
contiguous lands having valuable clay depos- cestui que trust, and this fiduciary relationits, discovers clay on other adjoining land, ship exists between surviving partner and
obtains option thereon, and enters into a con- legal representative of deceased partner.
tract with the group for a share of the pro- Sharp v. Sharp (1919) 54 U 262,180 P 580.
ceeds and upon consideration of his option
being turned over to the group, his employer Secret profits.
Member of partnership will not be permitis not chargeable with breach of trust toward
other original adventurers for failing to ted to take advantage of any secret agreeinform them of employee's discovery until ment to receive private or personal gain for
after he obtained option. Lane v. Peterson work or business carried on by partnership.
Paggi v. Skliris (1919) 54 U 88,179 P 739.
(1926) 68 U 585, 251 P 374.
Partnership income.
Where partnership was organized for purpose of furnishing supplies to laborers
employed by power and light company, and
one partner was to act as treasurer and furnish all foreign labor on construction work
for which he was to receive in full payment
thereof one-third of net profits of copartnership, it was held that money received for fur-

Collateral References.
Partnership <$=> 81.
68 CJS Partnership §5 76, 378.
60 AmJur 2d 35, 49, 50, 168, Partnership
§§ 108,124,126, 265.
Right of partner or member of joint adventure to share in misappropriated money or
property, or secret profits, for which he is
required to account, 118 ALR 640.

48-1-19. Right to an account* Any partner shall have the right to a
formal account as to partnership affairs:
(1) If he is wrongfully excluded from the partnership business or possession of its property by his copartners.
(2) If the right exists under the terms of any agreement.
(3) As provided by section 48-1-18.
(4) Whenever other circumstances render it just and reasonable.
History: L 1921, ch. 89, §22; R.S. 1933 &
C. 1943, 69-1-19.
Conditions precedent to accounting.
Before one partner can compel another
partner to pay what is claimed to be indebtedness to partnership, it must be first ascertained that amount is necessary in settling
partnership affairs, or that amount owing by
such partner is greater amount than he
would be entitled to receive upon striking
balance and finding interest of each partner
in assets of partnership. Bankers' Trust Co.
v. Riter (1920) 56 U 525,190 P 1113.
Duty to account.
Where one partner has forcibly expelled
the other and assumed control of and contin-

ued to carry on the business himself, the
partner thus working dissolution of the firm
must account to the injured partner.
Hannaman v. Karrick (1893) 9 U 236, 33 P
1039, affd. 168 US 328, 42 L Ed 484, 18 S Ct
135.
Estates of decedents.
Administrator of deceased partner held
entitled to maintain an action against heirs
of another partner for general accounting of
partnership affairs, where it appeared that
accounting was necessary, coupled with additional fact that estate of other partner had
been closed and personal representative
released from further duty in administration
of his estate. Bankers' Trust Co. v. Riter
(1920) 56 U 525,190 P1113.
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(3)

70A-2-201

timber to be cut is a contract for the sale of goods within this chapter whether the subject matter is to be severed by the buyer or
by the seller even though it forms part of the realty at the time
of contracting, and the parties can by identification effect a present
sale before severance.
The provisions of this section are subject to any third party rights
provided by the law relating to realty records, and the contract for
sale may be executed and recorded as a document transferring an
interest in land and shall then constitute notice to third parties of
the buyer's rights under the contract for sale.

History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 2-107; 1977, ch.
272, § 3.
Compiler's Notes.
The 1977 amendment substituted "minerals or the like (including oil or gas)" near
the beginning of subsec. (1) for "timber, minerals or the like"; and inserted "or of timber
to be cut" in the middle of subsec. (2).

Cross-References.
"Goods" defined, 70A-2-105, 70A-9-105 (f).
Secured transactions, sales of accounts,
contract rights and chattel paper, 70A-9-101
to70A-9-507.
S t a t u t e of f r a u d s
' ™A-2-201.
Collateral References.
Sales <&=> 10,11.
77 CJS Sales §§ 13,15.

PART 2
FORM, FORMATION AND READJUSTMENT OF CONTRACT
Section
70A-2-201.
70A-2-202.
70A-2-203.
70A-2-204.
70A-2-205.
70A-2-206.
70A-2-207.
70A-2-208.
70A-2-209.
70A-2-210.

Formal requirements — Statute of frauds.
Final written expression — Parol or extrinsic evidence.
Seals inoperative.
Formation in general.
Firm offers.
Offer and acceptance in formation of contract
Additional terms in acceptance or confirmation.
Course of performance or practical construction.
Modification, rescission and waiver.
Delegation of performance — Assignment of rights.

70A-2-201. Formal requirements — Statute of frauds.
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section a contract for the sale
of goods for the price of $500 or more is not enforceable by way
of action or defense unless there is some writing sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale has been made between the parties
and signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought or
by his authorized agent or broker. A writing is not insufficient
because it omits or incorrectly states a term agreed upon but the
contract is not enforceable under this paragraph beyond the quantity of goods shown in such writing.
(2) Between merchants if within a reasonable time a writing in confirmation of the contract and sufficient against the sender is received
and the party receiving it has reason to know its contents, it satisfies the requirements of subsection (1) against such party unless
written notice of objection to its contents is given within ten days
after it is received.
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70A-2-201
(3)

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

A contract which does not satisfy the requirements of subsection
(1) but which is valid in other respects is enforceable
(a)
if the goods are to be specially manufactured for the buyer
and are not suitable for sale to others in the ordinary course
of the seller's business and the seller, before notice of repudiation is received and under circumstances which reasonably indicate that the goods are for the buyer, has made
either a substantial beginning of their manufacture or commitments for their procurement; or
(b)
if the party against whom enforcement is sought admits in
his pleading, testimony or otherwise in court that a contract
for sale was made, but the contract is not enforceable under
this provision beyond the quantity of goods admitted; or
(c)
with respect to goods for which payment has been made and
accepted nr which have been received and accepted (section
70a-2-60C~

History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 2-201.
Cross-References.
"Action" defined, 70A-1-201 (1).
Additional terms in acceptance or confirmation, 70A-2-207.
Bulk sales, 70A-6-101 to 70A-6-111.
"Contract" defined, 70A-1-201 (11).
Modification, rescission and waiver,
70A-2-209.
Parol or extrinsic evidence, 70A-2-202.
Price payable in money, goods, realty, or
otherwise, 70A-2-304.
Statute of frauds generally, 25-5.
Admission of contract's existence.
Where party to a transaction between a
merchant and a nonmerchant admitted that
he would have considered himself bound by
their oral agreement if he had received confirmation of it within a reasonable time, the
admission did not bring into operation the
provisions of subd. (3) (b) and validate the
otherwise unenforceable agreement. Lish v.
Compton (1976) 547 P 2d 223.
"Between merchants" exception.
Since a farmer, party to a transaction with
a grain dealer, was not a "merchant" within
the meaning of this section, subsec. (2) did
not apply and the statute of frauds rendered
unenforceable an oral agreement to sell the
farmer's whole wheat crop, valued substantially in excess of $500. Lish v. Compton
(1976) 547 P 2d 223.
Confirmatory memorandum.
Where two elephant merchants agreed
over the telephone to the sale and purchase
of the animal "Peggy," and buyer sent seller

a letter confirming the terms of the sale
agreement, the statute of frauds was satisfied, since it did not appear that seller had
objected to the memorandum in writing.
Miller v. Kaye (1975) 545 P 2d 199.
Modification of contract.
The modification of a contract, which does
not contain a provision under 70A-2-209 (2)
requiring a signed writing applicable to the
modification in question, is governed by
subsecs. (1) and (2) of this section. Monroe,
Inc. v. Jack B. Parson Constr. Co. (1979) 604
P 2d 901.
Collateral References.
Frauds, Statute of <3= 81 et seq.; Sales <&=>
26 to 32.
37 CJS Frauds, Statute of § 138 et seq.; 77
CJS Sales §§ 58 to 64.
67 AmJur 2d 169 to 172, 213 to 217, Sales
§§ 57 to 60, 99 to 102.
Acceptance satisfying statute where purchaser in possession at time of sale, 111 ALR
1312.
Admission of contract by defendant as
affecting sufficiency of acts relied on to constitute part performance under statute of
frauds, 90 ALR 231.
Agency to purchase personal property for
another as within statute of frauds, 20 ALR
2d 1140.
Check as payment within contemplation of
statute of frauds, 8 ALR 2d 251.
Check or note as memorandum satisfying
statute of frauds, 20 ALR 363,153 ALR 1112.
Construction and application of UCC
§2-201 (3) (b) rendering contract of sale
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cific enough to bring to the attention of the
court all claimed errors in the instructions and
to give the court an opportunity to correct
them if the court deems it proper. Employers'
Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Allen Oil Co., 123 Utah
253, 258 P.2d 445 (1953).
——-Explanation of grounds.
To appeal the giving or the refusal of an instruction, a party must properly object to the
instructions in the trial court and explain its
grounds, with specificity, for challenging the
instructions. Morgan v. Quailbrook Condominium Co., 704 P.2d 573 (Utah 1985).
Written instructions.
—Failure to tender.
Waiver.
Where plaintiff had failed to tender a written instruction on burden of proof he could not
claim error in the lack of such instruction. Ful-

Rule 52

ler v. Zinik Sporting Goods Co., 538 P.2d 1036
(Utah 1975).
Cited in Wellman v. Noble, 12 Utah 2d 350,
366 P.2d 701 (1961); Hill v Cloward, 14 Utah
2d 55, 377 P.2d 186 (1962); Ortega v. Thomas,
14 Utah 2d 296, 383 P.2d 406 (1963); Meier v.
Christensen, 15 Utah 2d 182, 389 P.2d 734
(1964); Memmott v. United States Fuel Co., 22
Utah 2d 356, 453 P.2d 155 (1969); Telford v.
Newell J. Olsen & Sons Constr. Co., 25 Utah
2d 270, 480 P.2d 462 '1971); Flynn v. W.P.
Harlin Constr. Co., 29 Utah 2d 327, 509 P.2d
356 (1973); McGinn v. Utah Power & Light
Co., 529 P.2d 423 (Utah 1974); Henderson v.
Meyer, 533 P.2d 290 (Utah 1975); Lamkin v.
Lynch, 600 P.2d 530 (Utah 1979); State v. Hall,
671 P.2d 201 (Utah 1983); Highland Constr.
Co. v. Union Pac. R.R., 683 P.2d 1042 (Utah
1984); Gill v. Timm, 720 P.2d 1352 (Utah
1986); Penrod v. Carter, 737 P.2d 199 (Utah
1987); King v. Fereday, 739 P.2d 618 (Utah
1987).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 75 Am. Jur. 2d Trial § 573
et seq.
C.J.S. — 88 CJ.S. Trial §§ 266 to 448.
AJLR. — Propriety and prejudicial effect of
instructions in civil case as affected by the
manner in which they are written, 10 A.L.R.3d
501.
Sufficiency of evidence, in personal injury
action, to prove future pain and suffering and
to warrant instructions to jury thereon, 18
AJLR.3d 10.
Sufficiency of evidence, in personal injury
action, to prove impairment of earning capacity and to warrant instructions to jury thereon,
18 A.L.R.3d 88.
Sufficiency of evidence, in personal injury
action, to prove permanence of injuries and to
warrant instructions to jury thereon, 18
A.LJUd 170.
Propriety and effect, in eminent domain proceeding, of instruction to the jury as to landowner's unwillingness to sell property, 20
A.L.R.3d 1081.
Verdict-urging instructions in civil case

stressing desirability and importance of agreement, 38 A.L.R.3d 1281.
Verdict-urging instructions in civil case
commenting on weight of majority view or authorizing compromise, 41 A.L.R.3d 845.
Verdict-urging instructions in civil case admonishing jurors to refrain from intransigence
or reflecting on integrity or intelligence of jurors, 41 A.L.R.3d 1154.
Construction of statutes or rules making
mandatory the use of pattern or uniform approved jury instructions, 49 A.L.R.3d 128.
Necessity and propriety of instructing on alternative theories of negligence or breach of
warranty, where instruction on strict liability
in tort is given in products liability case, 52
A.L.R.3d 102.
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, construction and effect of provision in Rule 51, and similar state rules, that counsel be given opportunity to make objections to instructions out of
hearing of jury, 1 A.L.R. Fed. 310.
Key Numbers. — Trial «=» 182 to 296.

Rule 52. Findings by the court,
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an
advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its
conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule
58A; in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the
grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of
review. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence,
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given
149

Rule 52

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.
The findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be
considered as the findings of the court. It will be sufficient if the findings of
fact and conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open court following the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of
decision filed by the court. The trial court need not enter findings of fact and
conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule 41(b). The
court shall, however, issue a brief written statement of the ground for its
decision on all motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59
when the motion is based on more than one ground.
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after
entry of judgment the court may amend its findings or make additional findings and may amend the judgment accordingly. The motion may be made with
a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. When findings of fact are made
in actions tried by the court without a jury, the question of the sufficiency of
the evidence to support the findings may thereafter be raised whether or not
the party raising the question has made in the district court an objection to
such findings or has made either a motion to amend them, a motion for judgment, or a motion for a new trial.
(c) Waiver of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Except in actions
for divorce, findings of fact and conclusions of law may be waived by the
parties to an issue of fact:
(1) by default or by failing to appear at the trial;
(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause;
(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in the minutes.
(Amended, effective Jan. 1, 1987.)
Amendment Notes. — The 1986 amendment, in Subdivision (a), deleted "and" preceding win granting" in the first sentence, inserted
the third and fifth sentences, rewrote the sixth
sentence and added the last sentence.

Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 52, F.R.C.P.
Cross-References. — Masters, Rule 53.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Adoption.
—Abandonment of contract.
—Advisory verdict.
—Breach of contract.
—Child custody.
—Contempt.
In presence of court.
Written.
—Credibility of witnesses.
—Denial of motion.
—Divorce decree modifications.
—Easement.
—Evidentiary disputes.
—Juvenile action.
—Material issues.
Harmless error.
—Submission by prevailing party.
Court's discretion.
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FINDINGS OF FACT AND JUDGMENT

JOHN L. MCCOY (2164)
Attorney for Plaintiff
310 S. Main Street #1309
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: 355-6400
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
VERNON E. BUSH,

Plaintiff, ,

vs.

]

COMMERCE PROPERTIES, INC., a
]
Corporation, RICHARD C. BENNION,,
PROCESS INSTRUMENTS & CONTROL, ]
INC., and JOHN A. HALL,
]
Defendants. ;

JUDGMENT

Civil NO. C-87-1224
JUDGE SCOTT DANIELS

This matter came on for trial on the 14th day of
December, 1987, at the hour 9:00 a.m., the plaintiff appearing
personally and by and through his counsel of record, John L.
McCoy, and the defendants, Commerce Properties, Inc. and Richard
C. Bennion appearing by and through their counsel of record,
Marcus G. Theodore, and the defendants, Process Instruments &
Control, Inc. and John A. Hall, appearing by and through their
counsel of record, Peter M. Ennenga, and the Court having heard
oral testimony and received documentary evidence from all parties
as to all of the issues with respect to the claim of plaintiff
and the crossclaims

by both of the defendants, and having

heard oral argument from the respective counsel for the parties,
and the Court having made and entered its Findings of Fact
Conclusions of Law now makes and enters the following Judgjme

and

I T I S HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED t h a t
plaintiff

be and

defendants,

he

both

$13,000.00, plus

is

hereby

jointly

interest

awarded

and

a judgment

severally,

sum t o a c c r u e

paid

in f u l l ,

sum o f

interest

together

in

the

a t t h e r a t e of t e n p e r c e n t

A p r i l 4 , 1 9 8 5 i n t h e sum o f $ 3 , 5 3 7 . 8 4 f o r
said

against

at

a t o t a l of

t h e r a t e of

the
the

sum

(10%)

of
from

$16,537.84,

12% p e r annum

until

w i t h c o s t s of C o u r t h e r e i n a s s e s s e d a t

the

$600.43.
IT I S FURTHER HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED t h a t

if e i t h e r

of t h e d e f e n d a n t s

aforesaid
entitled
extent

judgment,

then

p a y a n y sum i n e x c e s s o f 50% o f
that

defendant

shall

to a judgment over a g a i n s t the o t h e r

that

s u c h p a y m e n t e x c e e d s 50% of

the

have

and

be

defendant to

the

judgment.

j

DATED t h i s Jt^j}

da

¥

of

December,

the

1987.

BY THE COURT:

( JUDgE SC0TT DANIELS

JOHN L. MCCOY (2164)
Attorney for Plaintiff
310 S. Main Street #1309
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: 355-6400
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
VERNON E. BUSH,
vs.

Plaintiff, ]
i
]i

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

COMMERCE PROPERTIES, INC., a
Corporation, RICHARD C. BENNION,
PROCESS INSTRUMENTS & CONTROL, ]
INC., and JOHN A. HALL,
Defendants. ]
This matter

Civil No. C-87-1224
JUDGE SCOTT DANIELS

came on for trial on the 14th day of

December, 1987, at the hour 9:00 a.m., the plaintiff appearing
personally and by and through his counsel of record, John L.
McCoy, and the defendants, Commerce Properties, Inc. and Richard
C. Bennion appearing personally and

by and through their counsel

of record, Marcus G. Theodore, and
Instruments
personally and

& Control,

the defendants, Process

Inc. and John A. Hall,

appearing

by and through their counsel of record, Peter M.

Ennenga, and the Court having heard oral testimony and received
documentary evidence from all parties as to all of the issues
with respect to the claim of plaintiff and the crossclaims by
both of the defendants, and having heard oral argument from the
•espective counsel for the parties, and being fully advised in
.he premises, now does hereby enter its Findings of Fact and

C o n c l u s i o n s of Law a s

follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT

1.
licensed

Plaintiff

architect
2.

at

all

times

material

was

a

i n the S t a t e of Utah.

An E a r n e s t Money Agreement: was s i g n e d b e t w e e n t h e

d e f e n d a n t s , R i c h a r d C. B e n n i o n , a s s e l l e r ,
buyer,

herein

and J o h n A. H a l l , a s

for t h e p u r c h a s e of c e r t a i n r e a l p r o p e r t y t o g e t h e r w i t h a

building

t o be c o n s t r u c t e d

t h e r e o n ; however, t h i s Court

finds

t h a t s a i d document was not an i n t e g r a t i o n of a l l of t h e t e r m s of
any a g r e e m e n t w h i c h e x i s t e d b e t w e e n t h e p a r t i e s and d o e s

not

preclude this

the

Court from h e a r i n g a l l of t h e e v i d e n c e between

p a r t i e s as t o what t h e a c t u a l a r r a n g e m e n t was between the v a r i o u s
d e f e n d a n t s a s t o t h e b u y i n g of t h e p r o p e r t y

described

and t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of t h e b u i l d i n g r e f e r r e d

to

3.

The e v i d e n c e shows t h a t a l l of

thereon

thereon.

the defendants

were

e n g a g e d i n a j o i n t v e n t u r e w i t h t h e i n t e n t of p u r c h a s i n g t h e r e a l
p r o p e r t y d e s c r i b e d i n t h e E a r n e s t Money Agreement,
a building thereon

f o r t h e use and

constructing

b e n e f i t of t h e d e f e n d a n t s ,

P r o c e s s I n s t r u m e n t & C o n t r o l , I n c . and John A- H a l l ,
transaction

t h e d e f e n d a n t s , Commerce P r o p e r t i e s ,

C. B e n n i o n , were t o r e c e i v e t e n p e r c e n t
of

said

which

I n c . and Richard

of t h e t o t a l

cost

defendants

vers

venture.
4.

encaged

(10%)

from

Further,

all

four

(4)

of

in the p r e l i m i n a r y p l a n n i n g of

the

the

building

to be

built

upon the real property,

the taking of bids for said project and

the application of a loan to fund said project from which all
defendants intended to benefit.
5.

While so engaged, the defendant, Richard Bennion,

as a co-venturor,
the

joint

requested that the plaintiff herein furnish to

venture

architectural

services

in

rendering

preliminary drawings and final plans for the construction of the
proposed

building,
6.

Pursuant

to

the

aforesaid

request

defendants, the plaintiff did in fact perform

said

of

the

architectural

services, and the Court finds that the agreed upon and reasonable
value of said architectural services was the sum of $13,000.00.
7.

The plaintiff is entitled to interest upon said sum

at the rate of 10% per annum from and after April 4, 1985 to the
dace of judgment, which is the sum of $3,537.84.
8.

As to the respective crossclaims of the defendants,

the Court finds that an Earnest Money Contract, Exhibit 11, was
signed between the defendants, Richard Bennion and John Hall.
However,

said

contract

was made

subject

to the approval of

financing for said project by the Small Business

Administration

within 60 days from the signing thereof and it is clear from the
evidence that said

financing was not accomplished

within the 60

day period or in fact ever accomplished, thus, there was no cause
of action upon this contract-

Further, the Court finds that the

oral

arrangement

existing

between

the

defendants,

Process

Instruments & Controls and John Hall and Commerce Properties and
Richard Bennion, that no fees were to be paid to Mr. Bennion or
Commerce Properties unless the project was funded, thus there is
no cause of action upon the crossclaim of Commerce Properties and
Richard Bennion as against Hall.
9.

As to the c r o s s c l a i m

by Hall and

PIC

against

Bennion and Commerce, the Court having previously found that all
of these parties were engaged in a joint venture with each other,
and were jointly and severally liable
by

plaintiff,

crossclaim,

the

Court

finds

because no payment

for the services rendered

no cause of

action

upon

said

has been made by Hall of the

amount owed to plaintiff.
10.

From

the aforesaid

Findings of Fact,

the Court

further makes the following Conclusions of Law:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The defendants, as joint venturors are jointly and

severally liable to the plaintiff in the sum of $13,000.00, plus
interest at the rate of 10% per annum

from and after April 4,

1985 until the date of judgment in the sum of $3,537.34, with
each such defendant being liable, as between themselves for 50%
of said judgment.
2.
sum

in

In the event that either of said defendants pay any

excess

of

50% of

the

aforesaid

1

judgment,

then

th-t

d e f e n d a n t s h a l l have and be

e n t i t l e d t o a judgment

over a g a i n s t

t h e o t h e r d e f e n d a n t t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t s u c h p a y m e n t e x c e e d s 50%
of t h e j u d g m e n t .

-

DATED t h i s ^ J ; _ i day of December, 1 9 8 7 .
BY THE COURT:

^D^ETSC^TT

DANIELS
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